Uncharted Waters: The Tragedy of the Nova Cura Grounding

 "The Final Voyage of Nova Cura"

By Capt.Nishant Mehta

On the morning of April 20, 2016, the Nova Cura, a freighter carrying 4,400 tonnes of steel, was gliding through the Aegean Sea on a course from Eregli to Aliaga, Turkey. She had already navigated the complex waterways of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, an intricate path requiring careful navigation and constant vigilance. With a draft of 5.8 meters, the ship seemed to be on course for another routine voyage.

But as is often the case at sea, small decisions can have big consequences.


The second mate had planned the initial route west of Lesbos, aiming for the port of Izmir. That route was sound and safe. However, when the orders changed, the new destination became Aliaga, where the vessel was to load a container bound for Lisbon. The altered route appeared to be shorter and would save about two hours, a crucial difference to ensure the container could be loaded the same day. The captain decided to make the change and time was of the essence.

Border between Greece and Turkey in Mytilini Strait. Source: GR4APP01/Dutch Safety board

As dawn broke on April 20th, the first mate took over the watch at 4 a.m. He quickly noticed a potential problem: the plotted route was uncomfortably close to shallow waters in the Mytilini Strait. He raised his concerns with the captain during the watch handover, and together they adjusted the waypoint slightly, moving it a mere 100 meters further south. It seemed like enough at the time.

By 9:50 a.m., the ship was cruising steadily through the strait. The captain, thinking all was well, briefly stepped away to make coffee, as was the crew’s usual routine. But just five minutes later, everything changed. A sudden, violent shudder reverberated through the ship, and the Nova Cura came to an abrupt halt.

Then, at precisely 09:55 hours, disaster struck.

Panic ensued on the bridge as the captain rushed back. According to the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), the vessel was in deep water—112 meters, to be precise. From the bridge wing, the captain could clearly see rocks beneath the ship. The Nova Cura had run aground.

The rocks were visible from the bridge wing of the Nova Cura. Source: Crew Nova Cura/Dutch Safety Board

The fore part of the ship floated freely, but from midship to stern, she was perched precariously on a rock. How could this have happened? The ECDIS still showed deep water, and the nearest shallow area was supposed to be 400 meters away, well to the north of the ship’s position.

The general alarm was sounded, and the crew rushed to their stations. Water began seeping into the ship through the double-bottom tanks, and soon the engine room was compromised. 

As the captain ordered the engine to be stopped, the Greek Coastguard was already en route to assist. They arrived within fifteen minutes but found a captain unwilling to pump out the rising water. He feared that any attempt to do so would release oil-contaminated water into the sea, creating an environmental hazard. Instead, he decided to leave the stern submerged, hoping it would keep the ship stable on the rocks.

As the day wore on, the situation aboard the Nova Cura worsened. Despite the captain’s best efforts, the water levels continued to rise, and the crew was eventually evacuated, save for the captain, who refused to leave his ship. The Greek Coastguard, maritime authorities, and even investigators from the Dutch Safety Board soon arrived to assess the situation.

Days turned into a week, and then a fierce storm struck the region. With the crew evacuated, the ship, now weakened and compromised, moved dangerously on the rock. The hold was breached, and water poured in, further damaging the vessel. The Nova Cura was now beyond saving.

Finally, the ship was towed to Piraeus, where she was declared a total loss. Her cargo was salvaged, but the ship itself was sold for scrap. 

And so, in a twist of fate, the Nova Cura’s final journey took her to Aliaga after all—not to unload steel, but to meet her end in the ship breaking yards.

How Are Nautical Charts Created? A Guide to Safe Maritime Navigation

So exactly what happened on the fateful day? Why did the vessel run aground in charted depths of 112m ? Lets try and understand the underlying reasons that led to the grounding of Nova Cura.

Nautical charts are essential tools for safe navigation on open waters, created through a detailed, standardised process. Available in both paper and digital forms, these charts help vessels avoid dangers and navigate safely. According to international maritime guidelines, each coastal country is responsible for charting its own waters. Specialised national agencies, such as the Dutch Royal Navy’s Hydrographic Service, create these charts for their regions. Globally, the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) sets standards to make sure that charts have consistent symbols and formats, so they’re easy to understand anywhere in the world.

The Basics of Paper and Digital Charts

  • Paper Charts: These are traditional, hard-copy charts that can be adapted from other countries or created from scratch, with each chart following an international numbering system for cross-border consistency.

  
Example of Paper Chart, Source https://www.admiralty.co.uk/charts

  • Digital Charts: Digital charts are of two main types:

    • Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs): Created by the coastal nations, ENCs store map data in layers that can be customized. This enables mariners to highlight important information like shallow waters or hazardous areas for enhanced safety.

Example of Electronic Navigational Chart, Source https://www.admiralty.co.uk/charts
    • Raster Navigational Charts (RNCs): RNCs are digital images of paper charts, containing identical details but lacking the layer-based customization of ENCs. Because they’re essentially scanned images, zooming in on RNCs can reduce clarity, limiting their precision. 

Example of Raster Chart (RNC), Source https://www.admiralty.co.uk/charts

By using these charts, vessels can safely navigate global waters with accurate, standardized information.

Understanding CATZOC Ratings and Data Reliability

Not all areas on electronic navigational charts (ENCs) are surveyed with the same accuracy, and some regions may have been charted decades ago using less advanced technology. This can leave gaps or inaccuracies in the precision of seabed contour details, potentially compromising navigation safety. 

To help mariners gauge the quality of data on ENCs, the Category Zone of Confidence (CATZOC) system rates the reliability of survey data on a scale from A1 (high confidence) to U (unassessed, or very low reliability).

In the case of the Nova Cura, the vessel's Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) showed a depth of 112 meters at the grounding location.

If the CATZOC rating was "U" for unassessed or of similarly low confidence, this would indicate potential inaccuracies in the charted information.



This highlights the importance of checking CATZOC ratings for each area when planning a voyage, especially in complex or high-traffic waterways. 

A low CATZOC rating warns navigators to exercise heightened caution, recognising that the area may lack the detailed or updated survey data necessary for precise navigation.


ENC displayed, left with CATZOC ‘enabled’, right with CATZOC ‘disabled’. Source: Dutch Safety Board

Navigational Challenges in Mytilini Strait: The Case of Nova Cura

The Mytilini Strait is a strategically important waterway between Turkey and Greece, and its navigational complexities were highlighted in 2016 when a vessel named Nova Cura ran aground on Lamnas Reef. This incident exposed the risks posed by outdated chart data and inconsistent information between paper and digital charts.

The Problem of Outdated Charts: The Case of Lamnas Reef

Lamnas Reef lies within Greek waters, where the national hydrographic service is responsible for creating both paper charts and ENCs for the area. However, these charts are based on survey data from 1967, using equipment far less precise than today’s technology. 

When electronic chart systems (known as ECDIS) became standard on ships, an ENC was made for Mytilini Strait in 2004—but it was still based on the old 1967 data. 

Greek paper nautical chart of the accident site. Source: Crew Nova Cura / Dutch Safety Board

This meant that while the ENC chart matched the paper version, both lacked the accuracy needed for safe navigation in this complex area. 

As a result, this digital chart received a low reliability rating( CatZoc "U"), meaning it didn’t offer the level of detail mariners could depend on.

Source : Lamnas Reef in BA1061/ Dutch Safety board.

Discrepancies in Chart Information: The Role of the UK Hydrographic Office

The UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) creates British Admiralty charts, which draw on satellite data and information from local sources, including Greece. 

To improve navigation safety in Mytilini Strait, UKHO introduced an information overlay (called Admiralty Information Overlay, or AIO) on their chart BA1061, which included essential notices on differences between British Admiralty charts and Greek ENCs. 

These notices serve as alerts, flagging issues like reef depth or hazard zones.

Zoomed in position of Nova Cura on ECDIS. Source: ECDIS Nova Cura / Dutch Safety Board.

Unfortunately, Nova Cura’s crew did not have this critical overlay(EP notices ) on board, leaving them without information about the area’s navigational hazards. 

Without these alerts, the crew had only outdated charts that inaccurately showed Lamnas Reef’s position, increasing their risk and couldn't identify any difference between the Paper chart and the Electronic chart.

Lessons from the Grounding of Nova Cura

After the incident, investigators examined three charts covering the accident area: a Greek paper chart, a Greek ENC, and a British Admiralty chart (BA1061). Here’s what they found:

  1. Outdated Data: Both Greek charts (paper and ENC) were based on outdated survey data, incorrectly showing Lamnas Reef’s position. By contrast, the BA chart placed the reef position using recent satellite data.

  2. Misleading Digital Displays: At the grounding site, the vessel’s electronic chart (ECDIS) indicated a safe depth, misinforming the crew that they were clear of danger. 

  3. Border Inconsistencies : Two adjacent ENCs covered the Greek and Turkish waters but with mismatched information at their borders, leading to sudden, confusing transitions that made it unclear where safe waters ended.

  4. Data Inconsistencies and Missing Overlays: Without the AIO notices from the UKHO, Nova Cura’s crew was unaware of critical differences between paper and digital charts, particularly the shallow reef hazards not marked on their Greek ENC. 

Key Takeaways for Navigators :
    1. Update and Review Charts Regularly: Ensure that all navigational charts are current. Up-to-date information significantly reduces risks in high-traffic zones and enhances safe passage.

    2. Use CATZOC Ratings to Assess Data Reliability: Pay close attention to CATZOC ratings on ENCs, as lower ratings suggest reduced data quality. Extra caution may be necessary in these areas to support confident decision-making.

    3. Consider Overlay Information, AIO, and EP Notices: Utilize supplementary notices like the UKHO’s AIO and EP Notices for critical updates. These overlays highlight inconsistencies across chart sources, providing added protection in potentially hazardous waters.

    4. Check ENC Boundaries Carefully: Be mindful when transiting between ENC regions, especially across different jurisdictions. Data continuity at these boundaries is essential to avoid unexpected depth or hazard changes.

Conclusion : 

Nova Cura’s grounding highlights the dangers of relying on outdated and inconsistent data, especially in waters with multiple national jurisdictions. 

Hydrographic offices worldwide need to prioritise regular data updates, coordinate chart boundaries, and make supplementary information widely available. 

These improvements would enhance safety for vessels navigating strategically important and heavily trafficked waters.

Acknowledgement:

  1. I would like to acknowledge the Dutch Safety Board for their comprehensive investigation report, Digital Navigation: Old Skills in New Technology — Lessons from the Grounding of the Nova Cura, which provided critical insights and images for this article.

  2. For the complete report on the M/V Nova Cura incident, please refer to https://onderzoeksraad.nl/en/

Disclaimer:

This article is intended solely for educational and informational purposes. The insights shared are based on publicly available findings from the M/V Nova Cura grounding incident and general maritime safety practices.

While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information, this content should not be interpreted as official legal or maritime guidance. Readers are encouraged to consult relevant maritime regulations, guidelines, and their company’s Safety Management Systems (SMS) for specific operational and safety protocols.

The author assumes no liability for any actions taken based on the information provided here.

Comments

  1. Delson R.October 29, 2024 at 10:43 PM

    Very nice story telling and at the same time a very informative writeup. Keep up the articles flowing.

    ReplyDelete

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